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This paper explores the dimensions of political and personal representativeness in the
context of Australian unionism in the period since World War Two. The first part of
the article is dedicated to an operationalisation of these two concepts within trade
unions, paying particular attention to the social origin of union leaders and their
democratic accountability. The two dimensions of representativeness generate a
two–by–two matrix which allows us to identify four types of union. The bulk of the
article is taken up by an assessment of representativeness in Australian unions in
relation to this matrix. The article concludes with some consideration of the
relationship between the two different dimensions of representativeness, and the
implications of this relationship for prospects for union revival.
Introduction
The issue of representation has a long history in the literature of political
science.1 While there are many aspects of representation that have been
canvassed in this literature, two themes recur. The first is personal
representativeness: the degree to which the personal characteristics (socio–
economic, demographic) of the politician or leader reflect those of the his or
her constituency. Personal representativeness, or what Birch (1971) refers to
as ‘microcosmic representativeness’, occurs where the representative is ‘in
* The ideas in this article have been formed during discussions with a range of friends and
colleagues since 1998. The single most important contribution was by Jeff Sparrow who
conducted the interviews which are referred to in this article and who also gave extremely
useful feedback on earlier drafts. Other critical input has come from Mick Armstrong, Diane
Fieldes, Rick Kuhn, Tess Lee-Ack, Georgina Murray, Tom O’Lincoln and Liz Ross. I would
also like to thank the Australian Bulletin of Labour referees for their comments which helped
to sharpen the argument considerably. None of these, however, bears any responsibility for
the final content. Finally, the article would not have been possible without the financial
assistance of The University of Queensland, in the form of an ARC Small Grant.
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some respects typical of a larger class of person to which he belongs’ (Birch
1971, p. 16). Studies of personal representativeness have been undertaken on
bodies as varied as the upper echelons of the British civil service, the House of
Lords, the Australian Labor Party, and the Australian High Court.
The second aspect of representativeness which features heavily in the
literature is political representativeness (or what Birch (1971, p. 15) refers to as
‘delegated representation’), the degree to which the politician or leader
faithfully represents the political interests of members. Representativeness of
this kind has the longer history of analysis which tends to concentrate on the
relationship between the agent and principal: to what extent is the agent
mandated by their principal (whether that be an individual or a constituency),
and to what extent are they free to act or vote according to their conscience or
their perception of the interests of the greater good (the nation, the association
etc.)? (Pennock 1968, pp. 12–13). Fundamental to political representativeness
is the existence of mechanisms of control over the agent by the principal, for
otherwise the fidelity of the former to the wishes of the latter is purely
episodic or coincidental. In mass institutions, political representativeness
therefore involves some consideration of democratic accountability.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the dimensions of political and
personal representativeness in the context of Australian unionism in the
period since World War Two. The first part of the article is dedicated to an
operationalisation of these two concepts within trade unions, paying
particular attention to the social origin of union leaders and their democratic
accountability. The two dimensions of representativeness generate a
two–by–two matrix which allows us to identify four types of union. The bulk
of the article is taken up by an assessment of representativeness in Australian
unions in relation to this matrix. The article concludes with some consideration
of the relationship between the two different dimensions of representativeness
and the implications of this relationship for prospects for union revival.
Union Representativeness in Theory
Personal Representativeness
There are many ways in which the personal representativeness of union
leaders might be measured. Two areas that have received attention are gender
(Nightingale 1991; Pocock 1995) and place of birth (Nicolaou 1991; Bertone
and Griffin 1992). In this paper I concentrate on social origins. The key
distinction in this respect is whether the leadership is ‘organic’ or ‘outsider’.
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Broadly speaking, organic union leaders are those who come from the ranks.
Organic union leaders are those sharing similar life experiences, with a similar
educational and social class background, as the members who elect them.
They are from the working class even if their new position in life means that
they have risen from it. While they are likely to be older than the average
member, given that organic union leaders by definition have worked to
establish a reputation in the ranks, they are otherwise unremarkable prior to
their reaching office, other than a particular enthusiasm for union work (and,
quite possibly, active membership of a political party). They are therefore
personally representative.
Outsiders are altogether different. Outsider union leaders do not arise from
the ranks but, as it were, parachute in to the relevant union. Usually lacking
any background in the occupation or industry, the outsider’s means of entry
into elected office is usually either by serving out the minimal time as a
member required in the union’s rules, or via an appointed position as research
officer, industrial officer, or organiser, in both cases followed by subsequent
incorporation onto a factional ‘ticket’ and election to a full–time position.
Unlikely to be from the working class (given that most aspiring union officials
from such a background would most likely stand for office in their own union),
outsiders are frequently attracted to union office for reasons of political
commitment, sometimes with a longer term objective of seeking preselection for
political office. Outsiders commonly select their union not because of any
familiarity with the occupation or calling of the members involved but because
of political expediency, as sponsorship by the incumbent leadership, and thus
similar factional alignment, is a necessity for people seeking union office by
this means. Given these factors, outsider leaders are unlikely to be personally
representative of members. By chance they may be of similar sex or national
background, but their socio–economic characteristics are likely to be different.
In particular, one would expect outsider leaders to have different work
experience (by definition) and educational characteristics (commonly in the
Australian case, such officials are university graduates with ALP
backgrounds).
Political Representativeness
The second form of representativeness is political representativeness, the
degree to which the leaders represent the interests of members. Given that
there exists a lengthy and still unresolved debate in the political science
literature about how such interests might be defined (Pitkin 1967, pp.
156–66), I use a variety of indirect means to infer representativeness. In
particular, I suggest that political representativeness occurs when leaders are
accountable to or otherwise under the control or influence of members. What
determines accountability and control? In this article, I suggest that two
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phenomena are crucial. First is the existence of formal constitutional
provisions which hold leaders accountable, that is representative democracy,
defined by Held (1988, p. 3) as ‘a system of rule embracing elected “officers”
who undertake to “represent” the interests and/or views of citizens within the
framework of “the rule of law”’. Relevant constitutional provisions might
include election, preferably direct election, of officials; right of recall of
officials; limited terms of office; regular representative conferences to
determine union policy; the right of factional opposition without expulsion;
and the right to circulate oppositional material amongst the membership.
The existence of many elements of representative democracy is, however, not
necessarily the best indicator of political representativeness. It is entirely
possible for political institutions to have formally very democratic
constitutions but to be led by figures who are only marginally under the control
of constituents or members. Just as important an indicator of accountability of
leaders, and thus political representativeness, is the presence of participatory
or direct democracy, defined by Held (1988, p. 3) as ‘a system of
decision–making about public affairs in which citizens are directly involved’.
Indications of direct democracy in trade unions include such things as the
presence and extensive rights of union delegates; the existence of workplace or
shop committees; the prevalence of section and mass meetings; and
attendance at meetings of all types. These are all means by which rank and file
members may, through their active participation, shape the goals, objectives,
strategies and tactics pursued by their leaders.
Although analytically independent, it is likely in practice that there will be
connections between participatory democracy and representative democracy.
Specifically, it is likely that the more entrenched is the former, the higher the
degree of representative democracy. An alert and active union membership is
likely to guard its democratic rights jealously and to strongly resist any
attempt to undermine democratic mechanisms that ensure control over its
leaders.
In unions which enjoy both representative and participatory forms of
democracy we may safely assume that the leadership is accountable. I infer
from this that they will also be politically representative. Any union leader
ignoring the wishes of members in such unions could not expect long tenure.
Even before being ejected from office, we might expect their writ to run no
further than their own office. By contrast, we might describe unions as
bureaucratic which have neither form of democracy, or perhaps only the
formal mechanisms of constitutional democracy without their regular use.
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A Synthesis
In Table 1, I bring together these two dimensions of representativeness to
define four union types.
Outsider bureaucratic unions (low political and personal representativeness)
are unions in which members are alienated from any involvement in the
running of their organisations. Such unions may either lack any semblance of
constitutional democracy or possess such but lack any internal culture of
participation and activity. A leadership cadre is formed and replenished from
a body of political activists with no organic link to the union membership.
Furthermore, the lack of membership involvement in union life means that no
challenges are forthcoming from the membership to this leadership cadre. Not
only does the lack of activism mean that the leadership caste is
self–reproducing, but this in turn breeds cynicism amongst members and
thereby deters membership involvement in their union. Outsider bureaucratic
unions are likely to be relatively stable and to be shaken only by the birth of
grassroots activism which throws up a challenge from below to the class of
union mandarins.
Organic democratic unions (high political and personal representativeness) are
the opposite to outsider bureaucratic unions in both key respects. Such unions
have a lively local culture of activism at the base level and regular membership
participation in union affairs. They will also have a tradition of official
positions being taken from the ranks. They are similar, however, in that they
are likely to be stable as a union type. Just as the absence of both political and
personal representativeness is mutually reinforcing in the case of outsider
bureaucratic unions, so the presence of both in the case of organic democratic
unions is likely to strengthen this union type. Participatory democracy in such
unions continuously creates and renews local networks of activists and, as a
result, the leadership body is regularly replenished by new blood from the rank
and file. This in turn creates a sense of ownership by members in their unions
and thus participatory democracy.
Organic bureaucratic unions (low political and high personal representative-
ness) and outsider democratic unions (high political and low personal
representativeness) are more complex. The former are unions where the
leadership is drawn from the rank and file membership but where the
instruments of democracy and accountability do not prevail in any meaningful
sense. There may be no constitutional provision for election of leadership or
right to form oppositions, or it may be simply that these exist but there is no
culture of direct participation to give meaning to these rights. In such
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Table 1: Union Type by Dimensions of Union Representativeness
Leadership political
representativeness
Leadership personal representativeness
Low High
Low Outsider bureaucratic Organic bureaucratic
High Outsider democratic Organic democratic
unions the leadership reproduces itself by cultivating individuals from the
rank and file and drawing them in, perhaps to organiser positions in the first
instance, as a form of de facto apprenticeship, before elevating them to elected
office by nomination on the leadership’s ticket. The leadership is ‘of’ the
membership but is not ‘for’ the membership in any significant sense.
Unlike the first two union types, organic bureaucratic unionism has embedded
within it an internal contradiction: the more bureaucratic the union, the less
likely over the long term is its organic leadership to be sustained. The
long–term limitation of this union type is a ‘leadership gap’—the situation in
which there is no evident successor generation of leadership, something that
may result from the inert state of union life at the grassroots. It is possible,
therefore, that in the long run such unions might simply slide into outsider
bureaucratic unions, as organic leaders seek to organise a line of succession
through appointed outsiders. Alternatively, a layer of local activists may
emerge to challenge the incumbent leadership by means of its activity amongst
membership and/or an election challenge. In this instance, the organic
bureaucratic union type becomes organic democratic.
Outsider democratic unions are likely to be the least significant and most
unstable of the four union types. They are run by outsiders and have both
representative and participatory forms of democracy. This union type is
unstable simply because a high level of workplace activism, and the means to
express the will of the membership through electoral means, is likely over time
to lead to workplace delegates being elected into leadership positions.
Outsider democratic unions are, therefore, likely to become organic democratic
unions over time. Alternatively, where the outsider leadership seeks to
reproduce itself by annulling various avenues of political representativeness,
the union simply mutates into the outsider bureaucratic form.
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Union Representativeness in Practice
Having outlined the framework for analysis, let us now examine how
representativeness in Australian unions has changed in the past 25 years in
relation to the union types identified above. This requires an analysis, first, of
trends in personal representativeness, followed by a study of trends in
political representativeness. Evidence for this section is derived from a series
of secondary and primary sources, including interviews with past and current
union officials.2
Trends in Personal Representativeness
Traditional Pattern
The majority of Australian union leaders in the post–war decades have been
organic leaders, that is, they arose from the ranks and were representative of
union members in relation to socio–economic background and work
experience. Until the 1970s and 1980s, most union officials had worked ‘at
the tools’ for the majority of their early life, only becoming full–time officials
after some years in the workforce. Dufty’s 1977 survey of West Australian
officials, for example, found that one–third had become officials when aged
41 or more, and three–quarters had at least 11 years prior work experience
(Dufty 1980, p. 175). This pattern is confirmed by Davis’ study of the 19
full–time officials in the Victorian branch of the Amalgamated Metal Workers
Union (AMWU) in 1976. Eleven of them were aged between 41 and 50 when
first elected to their positions, while a further two were aged between 51 and
60. Only one had been elected before the age of 30. These 19 officials had
served an average of 21 years membership before becoming an official, five of
them having been members for 30 years before taking an official position
(Davis 1978, p. 181–83). Callus’ 1984 survey of NSW union officials also
confirms that this pattern was a fair reflection of the situation in NSW in the
early 1980s: the majority of organisers had been shop stewards with at least
ten years of union membership, and most executive officers had spent more
than ten years as a member before obtaining office.
Outsider leaders were not entirely absent in this period. Conservative unions
such as the Clerks and the Shop Assistants employed university graduates in
leadership positions. The same occurred in left–wing unions even before World
War Two, with the Ironworkers appointing leading Communist Party of
Australia (CPA) member Ernie Thornton as temporary organiser in 1934
before electing him national secretary in 1936, despite his having no experience
as an ironworker (Murray and White 1982, p. 90). Likewise, the Mineworkers
Federation employed CPA member Edgar Ross not only as editor of the
union’s newspaper, Common Cause, but also as the union’s representative on
the NSW Labor Council Executive for nearly 30 years, despite his never having
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been a miner. Such appointments were the exception, however, and do not
alter the basic description of Australian union leadership as predominantly
organic until the 1970s.
New Pattern
Since the 1970s, the outsider leader has become increasingly significant within
the Australian labour movement. This trend is most apparent, not
coincidentally, within the movement’s most senior ranks. Three of the last five
ACTU Presidents (since 1969) have been officers whose entry into the union
movement has been via a stint as a ‘salaried expert’ (Bob Hawke, who served
as President from 1969 to 1980, Simon Crean (1985–90), and Martin Ferguson
(1990–95)).3 None of the three had worked outside the union movement as a
waged worker following graduation from university. The same is true for
former Secretary Bill Kelty and almost true for current Secretary Greg Combet
(see Table 2). There are also examples, however, of organic leaders even at the
highest levels of the ACTU. Cliff Dolan (ACTU President from 1980 to 1985)
had no university education and had trained and worked as an electrical
mechanic for 13 years, before becoming an organiser for 11 years and thence
NSW branch secretary of the Electrical Trades Union at the age of 40. Dolan
did not attain a seat on the ACTU Executive until the age of 51 (Who’s Who
1999). Jennie George (President 1995–2000) and now Sharan Burrow
(President 2000–) both worked as teachers prior to entering full–time office.
The result is that although outsiders form the majority, the ACTU leadership
has a mix of the two types.
The same mix is apparent throughout the union movement. Organisers tend to
be appointed both from the membership and from the ranks of university
graduates and political activists. Senior elected officials are drawn from
former organisers, former research and industrial officers, and direct from the
membership. Expert officers are the category of staff most likely to have been
recruited from outside the union, although this was not always the case. The
AMWU, for example, which was at the forefront of appointing expert officers
in the early 1970s, sought first of all to fill these positions from their own
ranks. The first education officers appointed by the union—Ted Gnatenko
(SA), Max Ogden (Victoria), Jim McKiernan (WA), and Bob Richardson
(NSW) were all tradesmen. This was also true of the union’s first research
officer (Jack Hutson, Victoria), and the union’s first workers compensation
officer (Sol Marks, Victoria). Similar practices prevailed in the NSW Builders
Labourers Federation in the early 1970s (Burgmann and Burgmann 1998, p.
68). Even today, some white–collar unions (such as the teachers unions and
the public service unions) rely almost exclusively on their own members for
such positions. Nonetheless, most blue–collar unions now use outsiders for
most expert positions.
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Table 2: Backgrounds of ACTU National Office Bearers, 1999
Name and
Position
Qualifications attained Work
experience
following
graduation
and before
becoming a
FTO
Career profile
Jennie George,
President
BA, Dip Ed, Sydney
University, 1969
5 years
secondary
school
teaching
1973: elected to full–time
position as welfare officer in
NSW Teachers Federation,
subsequently elected to
President and General
Secretary (1979).
1983: elected to ACTU
Executive.
1987: elected ACTU Vice
President
1989–91: appointed to senior
positions in TUTA
1991: elected ACTU Assistant
Secretary
1996: elected ACTU President
2000: resigned from ACTU and
appointed a director of Delta
Electricity (NSW power) as an
interim measure prior to
election to a seat in the NSW
Upper House.
Bill Kelty,
Secretary
BEc, La Trobe University,
1969
None 1970: appointed to position of
Industrial Officer, Storeman
and Packers Union
1974: appointed to position as
ACTU research officer
1977: elected ACTU Assistant
Secretary
1983: elected ACTU Secretary
2000: resigned from ACTU and
appointed a director of Linfox
(trucking and distribution).
Greg Combet,
Assistant
Secretary
Bachelor of Mining
Engineering (Hons.),
University of NSW;
BEc, Sydney University;
Diploma in Labour
Relations and Law,
Sydney University
1 year in
mining
industry; 4
years as
research
officer for
various
NGOs
1987: appointed Industrial
Officer, Waterside Workers
Federation
1993: appointed ACTU Senior
Industrial Officer.
1996: elected ACTU Assistant
Secretary
1999: ACTU Secretary elect
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Table 2 cont’d.
Name and
Position
Qualifications attained Work
experience
following
graduation
and before
becoming a
FTO
Career profile
Tim Pallas,
Assistant
Secretary
BA, ANU, 1981
LLB, ANU, 1983
None 1983: appointed Industrial
Officer, Firefighters Union
1985–94: appointed to
succession of positions within
Storeman and Packers Union
(subsequently National Union
of Workers) and finally elected
Assistant Secretary.
1994: elected ACTU Assistant
Secretary
Bill Mansfield,
Assistant
Secretary
Telecom technician
training, 1958–62
LLB, Melbourne
University, 1972
Telecom
Trainee/
Technical
officer in
Post Office,
4 years
1963: elected Assistant
Secretary Telecoms
Employees Association
(ATEA), Victorian branch.
1966–71: research assistant/
industrial officer in ATEA
federal office.
1972: elected Assistant General
Secretary
1977: elected Federal Secretary
ATEA
1985: elected ACTU Assistant
Secretary
Source:  ACTU National Voice Internet site: www.actu.asn.au/national/people/actu/
Although a mix of outsider and organic leaders is common, the growing
importance of the former is suggested by indirect evidence which demonstrates
a wide educational gap between leaders and members. Past generations of
organic union leaders in blue–collar unions had traditionally no experience of
university, and were disproportionately tradespeople or had only basic
qualifications. In 1970, 81 per cent of officials in Western Australia, for
example, had left school aged 15 or less, and only two per cent had tertiary
training (Johnston, cited in Dufty 1980). By 1977, the figure had dropped to
59 per cent (Dufty 1980, p. 174), but even as late as 1984, the majority of
NSW union secretaries who responded to Callus’ survey had left school at this
age. In white–collar unions, the much larger proportion of officials with
university degrees reflected the fact that the membership of such unions was
tertiary qualified in large part (Cupper 1983, p. 200).4 In both cases, therefore,
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it can be safely assumed that traditional organic leaders were personally
representative of the membership in relation to their educational background
(although in the case of unions covering skilled and unskilled workers, they
were more likely to have trades qualifications).
The growing significance of outsiders from the 1970s onwards is demonstrated
by the fact that union officials are now much more likely to be university
qualified, both in relation to the past and in relation to union members at
large. Table 3 demonstrates that in 1996, one–half (48.5 per cent) of all
Australian trade union officials possessed an undergraduate or postgraduate
university qualification, as against only one–quarter (25.6 per ent) of the
employed workforce.5
Likewise, the five senior ACTU officers held nine degrees or diplomas between
them (Table 2). This trend is likely to be exaggerated by the impact of the
ACTU’s Organising Works programme: nearly half (46.8%) of the 280 trainees
taken on by Organising Works between 1994 and 1998 were university
graduates (Turnbull 1995, p. 8; Organising Works Annual Report 1998). These
data together add weight to Scott’s observation:
Labor’s great achievement last century in overturning the old, elitist
attitude that ‘common’ people have no place in government has been
sadly compromised by the progress, in recent decades, of this doctrine
that ‘ordinary’ people have no real political role. The trade union
movement is facing a parallel erosion of grassroots participation, in
that the processes enabling rank and file workers to become senior
officials have broken down in many major unions and peak councils.
(Scott 1991, p. 49)
Trends in Political Representativeness
While trends in personal representativeness can be assessed relatively easily
by tracking educational and career profiles of union officials, trends in
political representativeness are rather more difficult to judge. Any attempt to
make a definitive judgement is complicated by the various ways in which
representative and participatory democracy can be measured, the balance
between these two—if a union becomes more democratic in terms of
representation but less democratic in terms of participation, what is the
overall outcome in terms of political representativeness of the leadership?—
and enormous variation between unions. In what follows I make some broad
judgements in relation to the overall picture, while acknowledging the fact that
these may not give full recognition to the complexity of the situation.
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Table 3: Highest Educational Qualification Attained, Full–Time Officials
and Employed Workers, By Age, 1996, Per Cent
Full–time officials By age (years)
16–24 25–49 50+ Total
Higher degree, postgraduate diploma 3.5 13.6 10.2 12.3
Bachelor degree, undergraduate and associate diploma 53.3 37.5 26.1 36.2
Skilled vocational qualification 0.0 10.6 19.8 11.8
Basic vocational qualification 4.6 3.9 3.7 3.9
No qualifications 38.6 34.4 40.3 35.9
Employed workers By age (years)
16–24 25–49 50+ Total
Higher degree or postgraduate diploma 0.5 5.3 5.0 4.4
Bachelor degree, undergraduate and associate diploma 14.5 23.8 18.1 21.2
Skilled vocational qualification 9.7 16.8 16.3 15.4
Basic vocational qualification 4.0 4.2 3.0 3.9
No qualifications 71.3 49.9 57.6 55.0
Notes: N (union officials): 4,171
N (employed workforce): 7,044,813
Source: ABS, Census of Population and Housing 1996
Traditional Pattern
Representative Democracy
If judged at the level of formal representative democracy, Australian unions
have traditionally rated modestly. Where membership pressure and leadership
inclination has not been sufficient in its own right, the intervention of the state,
in the form of the Industrial Registrar and Federal Court (applying relevant
legislation), has ensured that registered unions have had at least the formal
instruments of representative democracy (Boulton 1982). Conferences of
delegates, usually elected by members, are the sovereign body of most unions.
In between conferences, executive committees, elected either directly or on a
collegial basis, carry out the work of unions. These committees are usually
numerically dominated by lay members elected from the ranks, and votes are
usually limited to those elected by members, not appointees. Officials are
usually elected, usually for terms of no more than four years, and between
elections, the full–time leadership is accountable to the executive committee.
Provisions exist which prevent union officials from using union funds,
materials and publications for their own election campaigns. Opposition to
the incumbent leadership has not been grounds for expulsion from the union.
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There are strict limits to representative democracy in Australian unions,
however, and these are most evident at the highest levels of the ACTU whose
Executive is only elected by a collegiate method rather than by direct election.
Conferences are held every two years, but the President is elected only every
six years. No constitutional mechanism exists to enable rank and file members
of affiliated unions to remove the president, vice presidents or assistant
secretaries from office for inadequate performance. There is no constitutional
requirement for conference delegates (for the most part full–time officials) to
vote in accordance with the wishes of the majority of their members.
The main problem with representative democracy in Australian unions is not,
however, the absence of formal constitutional rights such as these, but the gap
between the existing mechanisms and the practice. In particular, a combination
of a leadership desire for self–preservation and membership apathy has
allowed union rule books to be severely compromised. The periodic history of
ballot–rigging in the Australian union movement, the misuse of union funds
and resources, the intimidation of opponents, and the ‘stacking’ of executive
committees and conferences are only a few indications of this fact.
Nonetheless, despite the many limitations of representative democracy that
do exist, Australian unions are not gangster unions. One indication of the fact
that members do retain some control over their leaders through constitutional
means is the fact that, at least when compared to American and British
unions, leadership turnover in Australian unions has been relatively high.
Participatory Democracy
If representative democracy was alive, if not in rude health, in most Australian
unions in the post–war decades, the same was not true of participatory
democracy. Indeed, it could be fairly said that the majority of unions scored
relatively poorly in relation to participatory democracy, a factor that set strict
limits to political representativeness. An important minority of unions,
however, did enjoy rather higher levels of participatory democracy. The key
factor determining the incidence of participatory democracy was the overall
industrial and political strategy pursued by unions. Table 4 summarises the
key features of the two dominant strategies in the post–war decades, the
‘arbitrationist’ and the ‘mobilisational’.
The arbitrationist strategy, by far the dominant, was usually associated with
top–down bureaucratic relations between leaders and members. Indeed, the
arbitrationist strategy was premised on such relations, as the Arbitration
Court/Commission usually relied on union leaders to maintain tight control
over ‘their’ unions in order to avoid strike activity while a hearing was in
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Table 4: Scope for Participatory Democracy: Arbitrationist and
Mobilisational Unionism
Arbitrationist Mobilisational
Period 1945–1990 1945–late 1970s
Exemplars Australian Workers Union; Shop
Distributive and Allied
Employees; Federated Clerks
Union; Vehicle Builders Union;
Federated Ironworkers
Association.
Australian Metal Workers Union
(and its predecessors); Building
Workers Industrial Union;
Waterside Workers Federation;
Builders Labourers Federation;
Victorian Secondary Teachers
Association (in later period).
Underlying goals Gradual economic improvement
through industrial and political
means.
Economic improvement
underpinned by vision of radical
social transformation.
Industrial
strategy
Distributive bargaining (win–lose)
limited by extent of claim
(modest) and terrain of struggle
(wages and hours).
More aggressive distributive
bargaining in relation to extent of
claim (substantial) and terrain of
struggle (equity issues; control
over work; social and political
demands).
Relations with
employers
‘Sweetheart’; preference
agreements; closed shops and
dues check–off, in return for
industrial peace.
Industrial campaigns at ‘hot–shops’
to make break–throughs.
Preference clauses and closed
shops won by industrial
campaigns.
Tactics in relation
to state
Emphasis on arbitration and deals
with ALP state governments.
Marginal role for political lobbying;
disdain for arbitration except
insofar as it was used to flow–on
gains from ‘hot shops’.
Attitude to strikes Extreme reluctance to strike
beyond what was necessary to
expedite an arbitration hearing.
Frequent preparedness to strike.
Approach by
FTOs to
members
Top down; bureaucratic; collusion
with employers to suppress
membership activism.
Participatory; active role of
delegates and mass meetings.
Role of delegates
and workplace
organisation
Minimal: guard against award
breaches; recruit and collect
dues.
Extensive: as for arbitrationist,
plus responsibility for waging
campaigns (sometimes quite
independently of FTOs).
Main mechanism
for
communication
between
leaders and
rank and file
Personal relations between
delegates and officials; branch
committees; branch journals and
newsletters. Otherwise relatively
little.
Mass meetings, delegate meetings;
branch committees; branch
journals and newsletters.
progress. Wildcat action by members, such as occurred at Mount Isa Mines in
1964 (Mackie 1989) and at the Ford Motor Company in 1973 and 1981
(Lever–Tracy and Quinlan 1988), only discredited and embarrassed the
arbitrationist union leader, and for this reason she/he was usually keen to
suppress independent member activism, not excluding co–operating with
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employers to have activists dismissed from their jobs. The suppression of such
activism also had the added advantage that it prevented the emergence of
potential rivals for the leadership office. Leadership succession in such unions
was usually a matter of hand–picking a favoured individual within the ranks
and grooming him or her for an accession to power.
The role of delegates in unions pursuing the arbitrationist strategy was limited
to that of guarding against award breaches, recruitment and collection of dues
(where no dues ‘check–off’ arrangements existed). Delegate training was
limited, and stewards were supported only insofar as they were perceived to
be useful to the political longevity of the leader. Such an approach
underpinned the ACTU’s 1961 policy on shop committees which, according to
Hutson (1966, p. 219), effectively reduced these bodies to ‘the minor role of
industrial boy scouts’. With little need for organising on the job, mass meetings
were few and far between, and communication from leaders to members was
usually fairly infrequent and mostly in the form of often dull union journals.
The choice of an arbitrationist strategy was usually self–reinforcing.
Suppression of autonomous organisation at workplace level meant that few
challenges to the power and strategy of union leaders emerged.
The nature of the internal regime in unions following a mobilisational strategy
was diametrically opposite to that in force in the arbitrationist unions. Such
unions were often characterised by a high level of membership, or at least
workplace activist, participation. Here we will give evidence of two such
unions, the engineers and the Victorian teachers unions. Membership
participation had a long tradition in the AEU, which until 1967 was run by
district committees. Full–time officials could attend and could speak at such
meetings, but had no voting rights. Typically the district committees would
invite the unions’ officials to the meeting so that they might give a report to
members about their activities. The AEU’s first appointed education officer,
Max Ogden, explains:
In the old district committees it was very interesting. It was physically
laid out so that all the district committee sat around the table and the
officials—the four or five we had—would only speak when they were
asked to, or when they gave their reports. All of that gave a culture of
rank and file control.
More important than the AEU’s constitutional structures in maintaining the
union’s democratic culture was the fact that the union very actively promoted
shop steward activity (Goss 1975; Scalmer and Irving 1999). Ted Gnatenko,
AEU shop steward at GMH Elizabeth and later the South Australian branch’s
first education officer, remarks that: ‘In the ‘60s and ‘70s, the shop stewards
were masters of the union, and the organisers were the servants’. While there is
certainly an element of exaggeration in this description (see Davis 1977, 1978
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for a discussion of the limits of steward participation in the AMWU), this
comment conveys something of the culture of the AEU and other metal trades
unions in the late 1960s in the larger and more active factories and workshops.
The Victorian teachers unions were an example of unions which in the early
post–war decades relied on arbitrationist methods (in their case involving
appearances before a State Government teachers’ tribunal), but which in the
wave of industrial action in the 1970s shifted to a mobilisational strategy.
Membership participation in these unions increased rapidly in this period. The
Victorian Secondary Teachers Association (VSTA) held frequent school
delegates meetings which had significant influence on the union’s monthly
state council meetings which took charge of the union between conferences.
State council meetings were attended by 40 or more rank and file teachers and
only one full–time official, the union’s president. Significant here was the fact
that the president was the only elected full–time official in this union. All
others were appointed. Political representativeness of the leadership, if judged
by representative democracy, was therefore minimal; in practice, however,
political representativeness was secured by the activity of the membership
which held its leadership accountable not at elections once every three or four
years but on an ongoing basis. Participatory democracy was also on the rise in
the Technical Teachers Union of Victoria (TTUV) at this time, Neil Kimpton, a
former organiser, recalling that:
A lot of the activity was school–based. Sometimes there were
state–wide actions, but much of the conditions were fought for on a
school–by–school basis… The culture of participation in those days
manifested itself at the school level through very strong union branches
in numbers of schools. There were active branches who not only took
action on themselves but who told the union what they thought should
be done in the areas of staffing or curriculum or whatever.
The Victorian teacher unions were not alone amongst the white–collar
public–sector professional associations in undergoing a sharp shift in the
1970s, with many branches of the various public–service unions also affected
by the influx of radical university graduates espousing democratic and
participatory union strategies (Kuhn 1980).
To summarise, Australian unionism in the post–war decades enjoyed elements
of representative democracy, but the degree to which union leaders could be
regarded as political representative was primarily dependent on the salience
of participatory democracy. A majority of unions might best be described as
bureaucratic in that they combined modest representative democracy with low
levels of participatory democracy. A minority, however, those which pursued
mobilisational strategies, might be regarded as politically representative in
that they had moderate to high levels of participatory democracy which
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ensured that mechanisms of representative democracy were more meaningful.
A further factor that needs to be borne in mind was the fact that the
relationship between representative democracy and participatory democracy
was not always straightforward. The type of constitutional provisions most of
interest to the Industrial Registrar were those aimed at curbing industrial
militancy rather than promoting democracy per se. Indeed, at times, union
leaders and arbitration commissioners made judicious use of union rules (most
especially those relating to the activities and rights (or lack thereof) of
workplace union committees) in order to constrain participatory democracy.
New Patterns
Decline in representative democracy
While the Australian union movement has undergone massive structural
change since the 1980s, particularly evident in the wave of amalgamations,
change in the area of representative democracy has been quite modest. In
relation to union rules regarding frequency of elections, for example, four years
still appears to be the most common term of office. Two factors do stand out,
however, as indicative of a decline in representative democracy. First is the
growing trend for ACTU leadership positions to be taken by those who have
either never faced a direct membership election or have done so on only one or
two occasions. The position in 1999 was as follows: Secretary Bill Kelty and
Assistant Secretary Greg Combet had never faced direct election by rank and
file members and rose to their current positions solely on the basis of
appointments and votes at ACTU congresses. Tim Pallas, the third ACTU
Assistant Secretary, had faced only one election, to his position as Assistant
Secretary of the National Union of Workers, having been appointed industrial
officer by that union some five years previously. The exceptions in 1999 were
President Jennie George and Assistant Secretary Bill Mansfield who had faced
members at direct elections on several occasions prior to taking senior
positions within the ACTU. Of the past ACTU presidents, Crean and Hawke
were never directly elected in any rank and file vote, while Ferguson faced
election in the Miscellaneous Workers Union on only two occasions, having
been appointed a research officer in the union’s federal office five years
previously.
The situation in the ACTU Executive is typical of a broader tendency for a
growing proportion of union staff to be appointed rather than elected,
something which automatically reduces democratic accountability of the
leadership body, both in relation to the officers concerned and because such
officers may be used by elected officials to buttress their own power and
reduce their vulnerability to election challenge.
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The second factor that has lessened the effectiveness of formal mechanisms of
representative democracy is the process of union amalgamation, which has
increased both complexity and size of unions. What are the interests of ‘the
membership’ in unions with a heterogeneous membership, where the
component unions have been amalgamated not on the basis of identity of
interest but factional alignment? And how might these interests be
safeguarded by members who are scattered across a large number of work-
places of very different types? The more blurred and uncertain are members’
collective interests and the less able are members to come together to advance
their interests, the more scope the leadership has to impose its own agenda. In
relation to size, the issue of election costs arises. The larger the union, the more
difficult it becomes for an opposition slate to find the resources to effectively
contest an election, and therefore, the more secure are the incumbents.
To summarise; although relatively little has changed in terms of constitutional
provisions underpinning representative democracy, the significance of these
provisions has been undermined by the fact that the officials duly elected are
a declining majority of those employed, and because participation in election
contests has become increasingly prohibitive in terms of costs and personnel.
Representative democracy in Australian unions has, therefore, diminished.
Decline in participatory democracy
More significant in terms of contributing to a decline in the level of political
representativeness of Australian union leaders since the 1970s has been the
decline in participatory democracy. By the time that Labor won office in 1983,
the grassroots organisation characteristic of the mobilisational unions in the
1960s and 1970s had significantly deteriorated.6 The corporatist strategy
associated with the Accord confirmed the demise of the mobilisational
strategy, as it was associated with the suppression of industrial campaigns
likely to threaten commitments by the unions to make no further claims
beyond those arising out of National Wage Cases (see Table 5).
Speaking of the metal unions, Ted Gnatenko recalls:
The Accord was the biggest factor in the decline of union activity,
because the power of the shop stewards, the concept of the log of claims,
the concept of participation was eliminated. And I think that was
viewed with a great deal of scepticism. The workers said ‘Why should
I attend meetings? Why should I do these things? It’s already been
decided on my behalf anyway. We didn’t make any input into it, and
it’s been endorsed on our behalf’.
….There was a disenchantment with the union. It accelerated apathy
amongst the membership. While they remained in the union, their
BRAMBLE 319
allegiances were questionable. They were there because they had to be
there in order to keep their jobs.
The involvement of some stewards, particularly full–time stewards, in
industry restructuring programs, and the introduction of second–tier
negotiations and award restructuring in the late 1980s may have brought some
delegates back into activity (Rimmer 1989, p. 141), but the political basis on
which they were active was very different to that in the 1960s and 1970s.
They were now incorporated into an agenda of improving company
competitiveness (frequently at the expense of jobs and working conditions),
rather than fighting for improved wages and conditions (Scalmer and Irving
1999).
The manufacturing unions were not alone in witnessing a decline in grassroots
activism in the Accord years. In the Victorian education unions, involvement in
budget–setting and a range of high–level consultative structures heralded a
significant shift in the centre of gravity of these unions. Neil Kimpton, formerly
organiser with the TTUV, explains the situation that prevailed in the Cain and
Kirner years:
You might have some action around the time that the agreements are
being negotiated, but once the agreements have been negotiated, the
vast number of the reasons for having stopworks disappeared. You’ve
agreed on the number of hours, you’ve agreed on the class sizes. So a lot
of the reasons disappeared. What you had in its place was organisers
policing the agreements rather than people taking industrial action
around it. And a formal grievance procedure was set up. If a principal
was silly enough to give someone too many kids in a class, you don’t
have a stop–work over it, you have a grievance. And an officer from the
union goes out there with an officer from the department and you argue
it out. You don’t need the people out on the grass.
The effect of these trends was a steady decline in school–based activity, the
centralisation of power within the unions, and, in the absence of mass
meetings associated with the mobilisational strategy, the distancing of leaders
from members.
It is now widely accepted in senior union circles that the corporatist strategy’s
undermining of workplace unionism backfired in some important respects
(Evatt Foundation 1995, p. 57). This has been responsible for the rise of what
might be called the activist approach which attempts to reverse years of
decline (Table 5). ACTU publications Unions 2001 and unions@work, in
particular, make much of the need for strong delegate organisation. However,
there are limits as to how far delegate activity is to be promoted under the
activist strategy. Specifically, an enhanced role for delegates does not appear
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Table 5: Scope for Participatory Democracy: Corporatist and Activist
Unionism
Corporatist Activist
Period 1983—93 1995—present
Examplars Australian Metal Workers Union,
Building Workers Industrial
Union, Community and Public
Sector Union
Australian Education Union,
Community and Public Sector
Union
Underlying goals (i) Business competitiveness
(ii) Social reforms through
Government action.
‘Holding the line’: survival and
renewal.
Industrial strategy Integrative bargaining (win–win),
but in practice acceptance of
work intensification and cuts in
real wages.
Distributive bargaining, evident in
living wage cases, but pursued
through legal and bureaucratic
avenues.
Relations with
employers
Partnership for industrial
efficiency.
Defensive in face of new employer
strategy of union–busting.
Tactics in relation
to state
Top–down deal–making between
ACTU and ALP federal
government, replicated at state
level
Disenchantment with ‘political
action’ (e.g. ‘never another
Accord’).
Active use of courts and arbitration
where possible (living wage
cases; unfair dismissal cases;
certification of enterprise
bargaining agreements;
management of change
agreements).
Relations with other
unions
In theory, ‘industry unionism’ driven
by ACTU amalgamation strategy;
in practice, federative unionism
driven by factional expediency.
Co–operation in adverse
circumstances (eg Construction,
Forestry, Mining and Energy
Union, Australian Metal Workers
Union, Maritime Union of Australia
and Communications, Electrical
and Plumbing Union alliance in
Victoria) alongside fratricidal
disputes within amalgamated
unions.
Attitude to strikes Hostility to strikes. Preparedness to strike in limited
circumstances when provoked by
employers. Emphasis on ‘positive
media image’.
Approach by FTOs
to members
Top down; bureaucratic;
involvement of narrow layer of
full–time delegates.
Nominally bottom–up and activist,
but in episodes of industrial
struggle (eg Maritime Union of
Australia; Construction, Forestry,
Mining and Energy Union at BHP)
top down and bureaucratic.
Role of delegates
and workplace
organisation
Minimal; some role for full–time
delegates in ‘restructuring
committees’, overseas tours etc.
Heavy emphasis on recruitment;
some responsibility for enterprise
bargaining.
Main mechanism for
communication
between leaders
and rank and file
Mainstream media appearances;
branch journals and newsletters.
Otherwise relatively little.
Growing use of marketing and
communication techniques:
surveys; focus groups; internet.
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to be associated with increased power for delegates. This was evident during
the MUA dispute with Patrick Stevedores, when delegates and members
played the role of back–up to the union’s legal and media strategies. Another
example of this trend was the campaign by the Victorian education unions
against the newly–elected Kennett Government in 1992–93. Following a series
of one–day strikes, the leaders of these unions resolved to bring relief to their
members by seeking refuge in a federal award. Neil Kimpton explains the
impact on the union:
… [W]e spent literally hundreds of thousands of dollars not on
campaigning but on lawyers’ fees, getting into the Commission and
getting the award up and running. And though we used our members to
put our case together, we did move into essentially the way which
every other white–collar union operates. We were no longer focussed on
the rank and file, the grass roots, but we were focussed on getting
something through the courts that would negate the need to have to
drag out the troops every other day.
The endorsement by the ACTU in unions@work of more elaborate channels of
communication, such as postal surveys, mail shots and email networks, also
has the effect of further marginalising membership control over their unions.
While apparently more effective in ensuring that every individual member is
contacted by the union office, such techniques are less participatory than
membership meetings because they frame the nature of relations between
leaders and members in an individualistic fashion, which strictly limits the
control by the latter over the former.
The activist strategy is implicitly based on an assessment that members
cannot be mobilised behind vigorous industrial campaigns because of fear
occasioned by years of high unemployment, legal strictures and the residual
impact of the Accord. This is certainly the case in the Australian Education
Union, whose school–based representative structures have now withered. The
monthly regional meetings, which used to attract dozens of delegates, are now
sparsely attended. Peter Lord from the Australian Education Union reports
that:
There’s been a decline in rank and file participation in all of those
unions [VTU, TTUV, VSTA] over the years. And rank and file
participation has now reached a stage where it is hardly much more
than nil. To say minimal is the politest way to describe it.
The problem is that the activist strategy itself does nothing to rebuild member
activism, and thus participatory democracy, as it shares with the
arbitrationist and the corporatist strategies, the conception of the membership
as an ‘object’ of leadership strategy rather than a subject capable of
determining its own destiny.
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There are signs of a challenge to the activist strategy, or perhaps more
accurately, a reinterpretation of the activist strategy which might contribute to
the revival of participatory democracy. This is most evident in Victoria: on
several occasions in recent years, the Victorian Trades Hall Council has
organised large rallies in protest at federal government industrial relations
plans, most recently with a demonstration of 80,000 against Reith’s ‘second
wave’ in November 1999. At the level of individual unions in Victoria, changes
within the AMWU and the increased linkages between this union, the CFMEU,
CEPU and MUA also suggest a more genuinely participatory approach to
union organising. Nonetheless, whether this leads to ongoing local organising
remains to be seen.
From the foregoing, it is evident, first, that there has been a moderate decline
in representative democracy in Australian unions since the 1970s and, second,
in that minority of unions which enjoyed elements of participatory democracy
in the 1960s and 1970s, this has been significantly reduced. The overall impact
is a decline in political representativeness and, therefore, a further shift in the
direction of bureaucratic unionism.
Summary
Referring back to Table 1, this review of Australian unionism in the period
since World War Two demonstrates that the majority of Australian unions
may traditionally best be described as ‘organic bureaucratic’ with a minority
characterised as ‘organic democratic’. Since the 1970s, however, Australian
unionism has moved towards the union type ‘outsider bureaucratic’. Organic
bureaucratic unionism has diminished and, as predicted, shows signs of
sliding into outsider bureaucratic unionism as a result of an ever increasing
reliance of outsiders. Organic democratic unionism has also declined under the
impact of the decline in mobilisational union strategies since the mid–1970s.
Discussion
This study of political representativeness and personal representativeness in
Australian unions suggests that the two concepts, although analytically
independent, are in practice inter–connected. This fact is intuitively fairly
straightforward in the case of the more traditional conservative or
arbitrationist unions. It has long been understood, for example, that the
domination of males, commonly graduates and almost universally with no
retail experience, in the leadership of the female–dominated Shop, Distributive
and Allied Employees Association is indicative of the negligible degree of rank
and file activism in this union. Little has changed in traditionally bureaucratic
unions of this type. The connection between the two dimensions of
representativeness is also evident when we consider trends in the formerly
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mobilisational unions. The evidence in these unions suggests that the decline in
political representativeness (occasioned by the decline in participatory
democracy) in such unions is responsible for the decline in personal
representativeness. This in turn contributes to a further decline in political
representativeness in such unions. Why is this so?
The corporatist strategy did not just reduce participatory democracy in
formerly mobilisational unions (as noted above in the case of the metal trades
and teacher unions), but also reinforced the tendency towards the
appointment of outsiders. The corporatist strategy was based upon high–level
intervention in a range of bipartite and tripartite committees at enterprise and
sector levels. The skills that were required were no longer those of mass
mobilisation but economics and law. Ted Gnatenko commented at the time:
The gulf [between the members and the national officials] tends to be
widened by the tendency of the ACTU, Trades and Labour Councils and
some unions at national level to appoint officers whose job is to advise
and provide information to national (federal) officials on matters such
as industry development and other matters… Increasingly, such people
tend to be selected for their academic qualifications rather than their
union experience or their commitment to the union movement.
(Gnatenko 1990, p. 10)
This process was substantially assisted by large–scale Government financial
support. Between 1984–85 and 1994–95, unions received $51.3 million in
grants from the Federal Government, most of which was tied to the
employment of labour technocrats who ‘serviced’ union involvement in such
processes, formulated strategies justifying union co–operation in them, and
helped to create an extended staff apparatus insulating the elected leaders
from membership pressure.
The parallel development of industrial partnership strategies and the
employment of outsiders is also clear from trends in the Victorian secondary
schools sector under the Cain Government. Brian Henderson, then secretary of
the VSTA, explains:
[W]ith Labor in office there was a chance for consultation when in the
past there wasn’t. […] This period called for a different set of skills in
the union office. In the past, all you had to do was say you didn’t like
what the government was putting up and then call your members out and
go into negotiations about it. But now you were talking about
implementing things in relation to system–wide change. We were
involved in discussions about budgets and budget targets that the
government wanted to meet, and how we could meet those targets.
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The type of skills now sought by unions were now defined by their ‘expert’
nature, the knowledge being defined as something that could only be brought
to the union by outsiders and learned through advanced study.
It has not just been the corporatist approach that has led to increasing reliance
on outsiders, but the activist approach as well. Where unions such as the
MUA rely less on port delegate committees and more on the courts and press
relations to advance their case, so the role of lawyers, financial advisers and
media consultants is enhanced. The same is true with the communication
strategies advocated by unions@work. This trend towards appointment of
outsiders is therefore both premised on and contributes further to a decline in
participatory democracy.
The other significant reason why the decline in participatory democracy led
over time to increased reliance on outsiders, and thus diminished personal
representativeness of union leaders, was because top–down unionism of the
type embedded in corporatist and activist strategies discourages the rise of
organic leaders from the ranks, thereby allowing, or making it more attractive
for unions to rely on outsiders.
Declining personal representativeness is therefore significant because it is
indicative of a change in the nature of unionism, from collective organisation
which brings together workers for the purpose of joint improvement of
conditions of employment and rights at work (albeit, admittedly, only in that
minority of unions which were mobilisational), to one in which experts are in
charge and in which members’ role is limited to that of a stage army used for
extra leverage at crucial points in negotiations. The long–term significance of
these trends was outlined by Gnatenko in 1990:
The consequences of these developments for the union movement are
most serious. The more ordinary members are excluded from the
decision–making process, the more agreements that are made without
consulting the membership, the more irrelevant the union will become
in their eyes. Agreement without consultation will also mean that the
shop stewards system, upon which the strength of the union movement
ultimately depends, will tend to wither away through simple lack of
use.
(Gnatenko 1990, p. 10)
While the decline in participatory democracy and thus political representa-
tiveness has had an impact on personal representativeness, so it is possible
that reduced personal representativeness has also had an impact on
participatory democracy, in that it may have contributed to membership
alienation from their unions. There is a general preference amongst members of
many unions for their leaders to come from the ranks, and the fact that this is
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increasingly not the case has important implications. Transport Workers
Union (TWU) organiser, Ivan McGillivray, reports on the culture amongst
truck drivers:
I don’t agree with people coming to unions from university backgrounds,
for the simple reason that I’ve been a worker all my life, and I think to
really appreciate and understand what our members have got to go
through you have to come through the ranks. […]
If you bring in university graduates, you are bringing in educated people
who have got no feeling for what the worker is going through starting
at bloody two or three in the morning, freezing his balls off, bloody on
the side of the road changing bloody tyres in the mud and the
shit—what experience has a university graduate got in that sort of
situation? And the driver comes to the yard and there’s some fella
there in a collar and fucken’ tie and he says, ‘Good morning sir. And how
are you this fine and lovely day?’. Well, how the fucking hell do you
think the member is going to respond? I know how I would respond. I’d
tell him to piss off!
Ted Gnatenko recalls the feeling prevalent in the AMWU in the heyday of the
Accord:
The ACTU thought that by having people with academic backgrounds,
they could match wits with the government… But it was very
demoralising, because the union membership did not see those people as
their people. They were either seen as neutral or as closer to the
employers because their English was different, their background was
different. Rightly or wrongly, that was how it was.
This attitude is not unique to blue–collar unions. Neil Kimpton reports on the
dominant beliefs in the TTUV in the 1970s and 1980s:
The ‘tech philosophy was that you needed people who knew what was
happening on the ground.… There was still that argument that all we
needed was people who had a teaching background and a union
background, who’d been ‘out on the grass’. That was the phrase that
was used. We needed someone who’d been out on the grass and in front of
a classroom with forty–plus kids.
Insofar as declining personal representativeness reduces members’ sense of
identification with their unions, it is therefore arguable (although certainly not
proven), that it contributes to lower participatory democracy. It may also lead
to a backlash. Chris Fennell, TWU organiser, explains how the current
Victorian branch leadership of this union came to office:
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We ran a ticket called ‘Kick the impostors out!’ because the majority of
the people were non–transport workers, not people from the industry.
We ran on a ticket to clean the industry up, to have transport people
representing transport workers. Every one of us is from the industry.
Similarly, the defeat by the Workers First faction of the incumbent leadership
of the metals division of the Victorian branch of the AMWU in 1998 was at
least partly attributed at the time to the (incorrect) perception that the union
office had been taken over by university graduates (Industrial Relations and
Management Letter, June 1998, p.12).
Reversing the trend to outsider bureaucratic unionism requires a fundamental
change in the strategies pursued by Australian unions in recent years, and
most importantly, the revival of rank and file activism and power. This is
crucial, first because it is necessary if participatory democracy and thus
political representativeness is to recover. Second, because such activism will
be crucial in generating a reservoir from which a new generation of organic
leaders may emerge. Merely replacing outsider leaders with organic leaders
with no other change will result only in the substitution of organic bureaucratic
leadership for its outsider variant.
Endnotes
1 See Pitkin (1967), Pennock and Chapman (1968) and Birch (1971) for overviews
of the classic literature.
2 The quotations that follow are drawn from these interviews, which took place
by phone or in person between January and May 1999.
3 Callus (1986) coined the term ‘salaried expert’ which usefully captures
positions such as research officer, industrial officer, and legal officer, posts
which are usually taken by university graduates.
4 Thirty–six per cent of officials from the 34 white–collar unions surveyed by
Cupper in 1979 held a university qualification (Cupper 1983, p. 200).
5 Unfortunately, the five–yearly Census does not distinguish between union
members and non–members. Hence a direct comparison between union officials
and union members in relation to educational qualifications is not possible.
6 See Hutson (1983, p. 226) for comment on the situation in the AMWU.
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